PILZ PSWZ X1P PDF

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All rights to this documentation are reserved by Pilz GmbH & Co. KG. Copies be made Intended use. The PSWZ X1P is used for safe standstill monitoring. Telephone: +49 , Telefax: +49 , E-Mail: [email protected] de. Standstill. PSWZ X1P. NSG-D Standstill monitor for safe. Safety relays from the PNOZ X product range monitor safe voltage or standstill. Safety relay (standalone) Outputs: 3 N/O, 1 N/C, 6 semiconductor. Automatic/manual reset UB - V AC, width: mm, Voltage monitor, safely monitors the voltage in three-phase supplies.


Pilz Pswz X1p Pdf

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download Pilz PSWZ X1P 24 → V ac/dc Safety Relay Single or Dual Channel With 2 Safety Contacts Datasheet PSWZX1P Safety Relay by PILZ. Automation technology from Pilz. Total customer proximity. Pilz has a tradition as a family- run company stretching PSWZ X1P. ◇ e. 3. ◇. ◇. ◇. PZE X4P. +41 62 • The Netherlands. +31 • Turkey. +90 Pilz. Page 4. 2. Pilz – Complete automation .. PSWZ X1P. PNOZ X2. 8P.

For each application In consultation with our customers we are constantly developing the technology for numerous applications. Whether you need safety or standard control functions, machine or plant, centralised or decentralised, a single product or a total solution: With Pilz you will definitely find a solution for your automation function.

Are you looking for a flexible solution for your automation functions? Your requirements: Our solution: PMD relays for electrical safety PMD: Electronic monitoring relays such as voltage or true power monitors, for example.

PNOZmulti: The safety circuit is created using a simple configuration tool. Can be used from four safety functions. All rightsreserved. For use only with embeddeddevices from Pilz. Support for these products provided by Pilz. Products and systems for safety and standard Besides Control technology and Networks, other product ranges also contain first-class components, which you can use individually or combine to form a system.

Sensor technology, used in conjunction with Pilz safe control technology, offers a co-ordinated, complete solution that s economical, approved and safe. The focus is always on the protection of man and machine, in compliance with the standards and regulations. Drive technology provides overall solutions for automating your machinery. From controller operation through to movement of highly dynamic drives, including all safety aspects.

Operator and visualisation systems provide diagnostic and visualisation devices, plus control and signal devices as part of the Pilz solution. The focus is always on fast, simple configuration. Machine downtimes are clearly reduced thanks to the overall diagnostic concept PVIS. Software includes system software, user software and software tools. Here you ll find the right tool for every task. Automation system PSS for standard and safety is the ideal system for automation solutions in all industries.

Reduce engineering effort and costs, now! Services in the machine safety field are available from Pilz for all phases of the machine lifecycle: from identification of the danger points through to implementation of safety concepts and overall solutions. From risk assessment through to ESPE inspection. Pilz also offers a comprehensive range of training courses and seminars, covering generic issues relating to machinery safety as well as Pilz products. The whole range of business activities at a glance: Webcode Online information at Services 5 8 Product area Control technology Safety relays PNOZ and configurable con The optimum safety solution for each application!

For us, safety is more than just a product. Safe control technology is based on experience and innovation. We are continually expanding our product range in consultation with our customers. You have specific requirements, we have the right solution!

Yes from page 54 from page 22 No No Ability to link safety functions? Yes No PNOZelog Further information from page 32 PNOZ X Further information from page 14 PNOZpower Further information from page 40 7 10 Product area Control technology The standard in safe control technology It pays to use safety technology The protection of man and machine through the targeted control of hazardous movements, cost savings thanks to fewer accidents, reduced downtimes and fewer production losses these are real benefits that you can enjoy when you use safe control technology from Pilz.

Internationally co-ordinated statutory instruments have been introduced to ensure that the same level of protection is guaranteed in all countries. Our safety relays comply with these international standards and regulations. Long service life and high availability ensure it is cost-effective to use.

SIL 3 represents the highest risk reduction and protection level, where the safety function High contribution to risk reduction Required performance level PL r design. A performance level PL is used for this, building upon the categories. The risk is estimated through consideration of the severity of injury Se , the frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard Fr , probability of occurrence of a hazardous event Pr and the possibility of avoiding or limiting the harm Av. Voltage, current, temperature, phase sequence or similar variables are monitored, for example.

You can reduce the number of hazardous situations for man and machine and increase the service life of plant and machinery.

Save costs and guarantee an efficient production cycle. Applications PMD s10 Using the measured true power, it is possible to derive variables such as fill level, volume, torque or air pressure, for example.

Thanks to the separate supply voltage, monitoring of the de-energised system is possible. Typical application areas include: Clinical operating theatres Offshore installations such as wind turbines, clarification plants and shiplifts Electroplating and surface finishing systems For universal use: only one unit to stock Quick and easy settings, just turn and click, so set-up and commissioning times are short Error-proof: menu-based configuration Ideal when exchanging units: configuration is stored on the chip card Simple diagnostics via the display mean minimum downtimes Approved for applications worldwide Features Measuring range is set automatically Switching thresholds are infinitely adjustable Function parameter settings are menu-driven via display and encoder with key function Analogue outputs for current and voltage.

The SIL must be defined for each subsystem. The probability of a dangerous failure is calculated by adding the probabilities of failure of all the subsystems of the SRECS: plus requirements for systematic safety integrity, comprising Requirements for avoidance of failures and Requirements for the control of systematic failures.

Well-tried means: the components have been widely used in the past with successful results in similar applications, or they have been manufactured using principles that demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related appli-cations.

Example: safety switch with forced-opening contacts. Well-tried safety principles are circuits that are constructed in such a way that certain faults can be avoided by the appropriate arrangement or layout of components. Example: avoiding a short circuit through appropriate separation, avoiding component failures that result from overdimensioning, using the failsafe principle on switching off.

Note: The occurrence of a fault can lead to the loss of the safety function. Category 2 Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed so that their safety function s are checked at suitable intervals by the machine control system.

The safety function s must be checked: at the machine start-up and prior to the initiation of any hazardous situation; periodically during operation, if the risk assessment and the kind of operation show that it is necessary. This check may be initiated automatically or manually.

Automatically, for example, the check may be initiated by a signal generated from a control system at suitable intervals. The automatic test should be provided by preference. The decision about the type of test depends on the risk assessment and the judgement of the end user or machine builder. If no fault is detected, operation may be approved as a result of the test.

If a fault is detected, an output must be generated to initiate appropriate control action. A second, independent shutdown route is required for this. Notes: In some cases Category 2 is not applicable because the checking of the safety function cannot be applied to all components and devices. Moreover, the cost involved in implementing Category 2 correctly may be considerable, so that it may make better economic sense to implement a different category.

In general Category 2 can be realised with electronic techniques. The system behaviour allows the occurrence of a fault to lead to the loss of the safety function between checks; the loss of the safety function is detected by the check.

Category 3 Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to the loss of the safety function. Whenever reasonably practicable, the single fault shall be detected at or before the next demand upon the safety function. This does not mean that all faults will be detected.

XB4BD33 SELECTOR SWITCH UNIT

The accumulation of undetected faults can lead to an unintended output signal and a hazardous situation at the machine. Category 4 Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to a loss of the safety function; the single fault must be detected at or before the next demand upon the safety functions e.

If this detection is not possible, then an accumulation of faults shall not lead to a loss of the safety function. Contactors KM1 and KM2 de-energise.

Safety assessment The safety relay K1 and contactors KM1 and KM2 must bei installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output. Earth fault in the input circuit is detected.

How we do it?

A fault on the device does not lead to the loss of the safety function. This avoids an unwanted reset before the input circuit is closed or as a result of the reset button being overridden. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K1 open.

This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K1 off and then on again. As a result the input circuit on the contact expander module PZE X4.

The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K5 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In Safety assessment The safety relay K1 and the contactors KM1 and KM2 must be installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output.

Earth faults and shorts between contacts in the input circuit are detected. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K5 open.

This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K5 off and then on again. The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s4 K1 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s4 K1 off and then on again.

The delay-on de-energisation safety contact switches off contactors KM1and KM2 after a delay. In this way, the drive controller A1 is isolated from the energy supply mains after a delay. The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K1 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In The delay time on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K1 is set using the time selector switch t[s] and the factor selector switch n.

Safety assessment The safety relay K1 and contactors KM1 and KM2 must be installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output. The delay time set for the safety relay PNOZ s5 K1 must be longer than the maximum braking time on the drive regulator A1.

The time delay must not be able to cause an additional hazard. Pilz products Number Designation Order number 1 PNOZ s PITestop Set If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode or the rotary switch for the time setting is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K1 open. In this way, the drive controller A2 is isolated from the energy supply mains after a delay.

As a result the input circuit on safety relay PNOZ s9 K3 is interrupted, the safety contacts on K3 switch off after a delay. In this way, the drive controller A3 is isolated from the energy supply mains after a delay.

The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K2 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s9 K3 must be set to Delay-on deenergisation, not retriggerable. The delay time set for the safety relay PNOZ s5 K2 must be longer than the maximum braking time on the drive regulator A2.

The delay time set for the safety relay PNOZ s9 K3 must be longer than the maximum braking time on the drive regulator A3. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode at K2 or the rotary switch for the time setting is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K2 and K3 open.

This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K2 off and then on again. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode at K3 or the rotary switch for the time settings is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K3 open. As a result the input circuit on the contact expander module PNOZ s7 K5 is interrupted, the safety contacts on K5 open. As a result the supply voltage on the contact expander module PNOZ s7 K6 is interrupted, the safety contacts on K6 open.

As the time selector switch t[s] is set to 0, all the safety contacts on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K4 switch off immediately. The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K4 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In On the safety relay PNOZ s5 K4 , the time selector switch t[s] must be set to 0 and the factor selector switch n to 1.

Safety assessment The safety relays K4, K5, K6 and the contactors KM1 and KM2 must be installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K4 open.

A performance level PL is used for this, building upon the categories. The risk must be estimated and the performance level defined for each hazard on which the risk is to be reduced through control measures. The risk is estimated through consideration of the severity of injury S , the frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard F and the possibility of avoiding or limiting the harm P.

Parameters S, F and P are used on the risk graph to determine the required performance level PLr for a safety function. The selection of parameters is no different to the procedure used in EN However, the result is no longer a category but a PL. Input Logic solving Output When using a designated architecture or an architecture of similar structure, the achieved PL can be calculated graphically using the bar chart.

From Category 2 onwards, the CCF will also need to be examined. The standard provides tables and check lists for calculating the other values. If this condition is not met, the safety function must be implemented differently. Quantitative and qualitative examinations of the safety functions form the basis.

Risk estimation is an iterative process, i. The risk must be estimated and the SIL defined for each hazard on which the risk is to be reduced through control measures.

The risk is estimated through consideration of the severity of injury Se , the frequency and duration of exposure to the hazard Fr , probability of occurrence of a hazardous event Pr and the possibility of avoiding or limiting the harm Av. The required probability of failure, depending on the SIL, can be taken from the table. The subsystems are assigned to actual devices. The SIL must be defined for each subsystem.

The probability of a dangerous failure is calculated by adding the probabilities of failure of all the subsystems of the SRECS: plus requirements for systematic safety integrity, comprising Requirements for avoidance of failures and Requirements for the control of systematic failures.

Well-tried means: the components have been widely used in the past with successful results in similar applications, or they have been manufactured using principles that demonstrate its suitability and reliability for safety-related appli-cations. Example: safety switch with forced-opening contacts.

Well-tried safety principles are circuits that are constructed in such a way that certain faults can be avoided by the appropriate arrangement or layout of components. Example: avoiding a short circuit through appropriate separation, avoiding component failures that result from overdimensioning, using the failsafe principle on switching off.

Note: The occurrence of a fault can lead to the loss of the safety function. Category 2 Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed so that their safety function s are checked at suitable intervals by the machine control system.

The safety function s must be checked: at the machine start-up and prior to the initiation of any hazardous situation; periodically during operation, if the risk assessment and the kind of operation show that it is necessary. This check may be initiated automatically or manually.

Relays for functional safety PNOZ®, configurable control

Automatically, for example, the check may be initiated by a signal generated from a control system at suitable intervals. The automatic test should be provided by preference. The decision about the type of test depends on the risk assessment and the judgement of the end user or machine builder. If no fault is detected, operation may be approved as a result of the test.

If a fault is detected, an output must be generated to initiate appropriate control action.

Relays for functional safety PNOZ, configurable control system PNOZmulti

A second, independent shutdown route is required for this. Notes: In some cases Category 2 is not applicable because the checking of the safety function cannot be applied to all components and devices. Moreover, the cost involved in implementing Category 2 correctly may be considerable, so that it may make better economic sense to implement a different category.

In general Category 2 can be realised with electronic techniques. The system behaviour allows the occurrence of a fault to lead to the loss of the safety function between checks; the loss of the safety function is detected by the check.

Category 3 Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to the loss of the safety function. Whenever reasonably practicable, the single fault shall be detected at or before the next demand upon the safety function. This does not mean that all faults will be detected.

The accumulation of undetected faults can lead to an unintended output signal and a hazardous situation at the machine. Category 4 Safety-related parts of control systems must be designed so that a single fault in any of these parts does not lead to a loss of the safety function; the single fault must be detected at or before the next demand upon the safety functions e. If this detection is not possible, then an accumulation of faults shall not lead to a loss of the safety function.

Contactors KM1 and KM2 de-energise. Safety assessment The safety relay K1 and contactors KM1 and KM2 must bei installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output. Earth fault in the input circuit is detected. A fault on the device does not lead to the loss of the safety function.

This avoids an unwanted reset before the input circuit is closed or as a result of the reset button being overridden. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K1 open. This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K1 off and then on again.

As a result the input circuit on the contact expander module PZE X4. The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K5 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In Safety assessment The safety relay K1 and the contactors KM1 and KM2 must be installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output.

Earth faults and shorts between contacts in the input circuit are detected. If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K5 open. This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K5 off and then on again. The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s4 K1 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In This fault condition can only be rectified by switching the supply voltage on the safety relay PNOZ s4 K1 off and then on again.

The delay-on de-energisation safety contact switches off contactors KM1and KM2 after a delay. In this way, the drive controller A1 is isolated from the energy supply mains after a delay. The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K1 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In The delay time on the safety relay PNOZ s5 K1 is set using the time selector switch t[s] and the factor selector switch n.

PNOZ X2.8 .. 777302 PILZ, PNOZ X2.8 .. 777302 Datasheet

Safety assessment The safety relay K1 and contactors KM1 and KM2 must be installed in a single mounting area control cabinet in order to exclude a short across the output. The delay time set for the safety relay PNOZ s5 K1 must be longer than the maximum braking time on the drive regulator A1. The time delay must not be able to cause an additional hazard. Pilz products Number Designation Order number 1 PNOZ s PITestop Set If the position of the operating mode selector switch mode or the rotary switch for the time setting is changed during operation, an error message will be triggered; the safety contacts on K1 open.

In this way, the drive controller A2 is isolated from the energy supply mains after a delay.Sensor technology, used in conjunction with Pilz safe control technology, offers a co-ordinated, complete solution that s economical, approved and safe. Krk's suggestion with a back-EMF sensing relay is a good idea. Machinery and any corresponding technical accessories undergo a type approval test through a European notified body, for example.

The operating mode selector switch mode on the safety relay PNOZ s3 K5 must be set to Monitored reset, falling edge with detection of shorts across contacts In As a result the input circuit on the contact expander module PZE X4.